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Cokeley: Statutory Construction

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
I.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

State ex rel Simpkins v. Harvey, 305 S.E.2d 268 (W. Va. 1983).
Ohio County Commission v. Manchin, 301 S.E.2d 183 (W. Va. 1983).
During the survey period, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
was called upon to determine the legislative intent behind two statutes. In interpreting these two statutes, the court indicated that it would look beyond
the mere words on the page to reach a decision that was consistent not only
with the intent behind that statute but, more importantly, consistent with
the general policy existent in the body of law encompassing that statute.
In State ex reL Simpkins v. Harvey' the court addressed issues related to
the sentencing of a person convicted of negligent homicide while driving
under the influence of alcohol. The court's discussion focused upon the
statute imposing penalties against such a driver.
The relator in Harvey had been charged with negligently causing the
death of another while driving under the influence of alcohol. 2 A plea bargaining agreement was reached with the state. However, before entering his
plea, the defendant (the relator on appeal) requested that a presentence investigation report be prepared to assist in determining whether the defendant should be placed on probation or confined in a youthful male offender
center. The trial court denied the request on the ground that the report
would be useless since the language of the statute required mandatory sentencing,3 whereupon, the defendant petitioned the state supreme court to
order the trial court judge to grant his request.
The court examined the "interrelationship" between the probation statutes,4 the Youthful Male Offender Act,5 and the statute prescribing the penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol.'
The respondent, the Honorable Robert Harvey, Judge of the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County, argued that the applicable Code section was a
specific enactment imposing mandatory sentencing upon offenders should
305 S.E.2d 268 (W. Va. 1983).
W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2 (1974 & Supp. 1983) (persons driving under influence of intoxicating

liquor or drugs).
' W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2 provided, in pertinent part:
(1) The sentences provided herein upon conviction of a violation of this article are mandatory and shall not be subject to suspension or probation, except that the court may
provide for community service, or work release alternatives, or weekends or part-time

confinements.
(This is the language of the section as it read when this case was being decided; it was later
amended.)
W. VA. CODE §§ 62-12-1 to -22 (1977).
W. VA. CODE §§ 25-4-1 to -7 (1980).
a W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2 (1974 & Supp. 1983).
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control over the general provisions of the probation statutes granting courts
probationary power and should also control over the Youthful Male Offender
Act." The court, however, did not find the acts inconsistent.' In fact, in looking at the language of the statute,' the court noted an exception" which
limited the mandatory language: "[E]xcept that the court may provide for
community service, or work release alternatives, or weekends or part-time
confinements."" The court relied on an old West Virginia case in declaring
that such an exception or proviso to a penal statute triggered the rule of
strict construction." Consequently, the court said the statute must be construed in favor of the defendant." Hence, the court held that when one of the
four alternative sentences was imposed, the restriction against probation or
suspension did not apply. 4
Supporting the court's interpretation that the statute's language did not
completely bar probation or suspension was its finding that the prevailing
purpose of the statute was that of rehabilitation. The court had stated that
if the language of a statute is ambiguous, "the court, in ascertaining the legislative intent, should consider the subject matter of the legislation, its purposes, objects and effects in addition to its express terms."'8 The court,
however, never made a finding or rendered a statement that the language of
the statute was ambiguous. Nevertheless, the court embarked on a discussion
of how probation furthered the cause of rehabilitation and was thus "consistent with the rehabilitative thrust of W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2.""l
Having established the availability of probation and suspension, the court
then considered whether confinement to a youthful male offender center was
an alternative under the provisions of the West Virginia Code. 8 After noting
that the four alternatives mentioned in the statute were less restrictive than
confinement in the penitentiary, the court stated that "[iln light of [the] authorized sentencing alternatives, it would require a strained and incongruous
7 305 S.E.2d at 273.
Id.
See supra note 3.
Although worded as an "exception," the court noted that the clause was in the nature of a
"proviso." "In traditional terms, an 'exception' is said to restrict the enacting clause of the statute
to a particular case, while a 'proviso' is said to remove special cases from the general enactment
and provide for them specially." 305 S.E.2d at 273 n.7 (citing IA SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.22 (1972)).

" 305 S.E.2d at 273 (quoting part of section 170-5-2).
12 Id. at 273-74 (citing State v. Cunningham, 90 W. Va. 806, 111 S.E. 835 (1922)).
"3Id. at 274.

14
Id.
" Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 62-13-1 (Supp. 1983), which requires that rehabilitation be the
primary goal of the West Virginia Penal System).
"Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
"Id. at 276.
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interpretation of W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2 to conclude that the statute precluded the more restrictive alternative of confinement in a youthful male offender treatment center."19 Hence, the court applied the rule that it would,
whenever possible, construe a statute so as to avoid absurd, inconsistent, unjust, or unreasonable results."
The major fault with the court's reasoning is that it fails to consider
whether the Legislature could have rationally chosen to disregard confinement in a youthful male offender center as an option under section 17C-5-2. If
giving effect to the Legislature's intent is as important as the court says it
is,2 1 perhaps the intent as expressed on the face of the statute should not be
so hurriedly cast aside.'
The key question concerning the intent of the Legislature took another
twist during the 1983 session of the Legislature. Section 17C-5-2 was
amended, with the four specified sentencing alternatives being replaced with
language allowing the trial court to impose conditions under West Virginia's
work release statute.2 This change would not affect the court's analysis in
favor of probation and suspension being available, as the alternative is still
expressed in the form of a proviso. However, this second failure by the Legislature to provide for the utilization of youthful male offender centers brings
into question the accuracy of the court in second guessing the Legislature on
that point. Nonetheless, given the nature of the court's analysis, it is probable that confinement in a youthful male offender center will continue to be
an alternative under the amended Code section.
The court was called upon in Ohio County Commission v. Manchin21 to
construe the language of a section of West Virginia's election code, which
provides for a check on an electronic voting machine's accuracy by comparing
its totals with a manual count.' The dispute was whether the statute man"Id. at 277.
See, e.g., Parsons v. Roane County Court, 92 W. Va. 490, 115 S.E. 473 (1922); American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); Richardson v. State Compensation Comm'r, 137
W. Va. 819, 74 S.E.2d 258 (1953); and State ex rel. McLaughlin v. Morris, 128 W. Va. 456, 37 S.E.2d
85 (1946).
21 Id. at 273.
A West Virginia jurist from an earlier time had some thoughts on what the court might be
perceived to have done here:
It is not within the province of a court, in the course of the construction of a statute, to
make or supervise legislation; and a statute may not, under the guise of interpretation,
be modified, revised, amended, distorted, rewritten, or given a construction of which its
words are not susceptible, or which is repugnant to its terms.
State ex rel. McLaughlin v. Morris, 128 W. Va. 456, 463, 37 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1946) (Haymond, J.,
dissenting).
23 W. VA. CODE § 62-IIA-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983) (release for work and other purposes).
2, 301 S.E.2d 183 (W. Va. 1983).
2 W. VA. CODE § 3-4a-28(4) (Supp. 1983) provides in part:
During the canvass and any requested recount, at least five percent of the precincts
21
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dated that votes on the electronic voting ballots be counted, or just the
ballots themselves. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruled that only the
ballots should be counted; the supreme court of appeals reversed.
Justice Miller, writing for the court, found a two-step analysis to be proper in resolving the issues at hand. First, the court should determine if there
was any ambiguity in the language of the statute." If the statute was not ambiguous, it would be applied as expressed.' Second, if there was ambiguity,
the court should endeavor to interpret the statute by ascertaining the legislative intent.' This intent could be found by reading the statute as a whole, the
court noted."
The court found an element of ambiguity in the section's meaning." It
opined that other parts of the section indicated that the Legislature might
have taken for granted the meaning it attached to the section.'1 After raising
a few interpretations to point out the ambiguity, the court took up the matter of legislative intent.2 On this point, the court resorted to reading the statute as a whole. Of particular import to the court was its perceived purpose of
the statute-to check the accuracy of the machine. It resolved that this end
could be better accomplished by comparing the votes of the machine count to
a manual count. Hence, reading from the four corners of the statute, the
court professed to give effect to its notion of the correct legislative
intention."

It is curious that the court did not make special mention of the rule of
construction by which a court seeks to avoid interpreting a statute so as to
produce an absurd or ridiculous result. If the intent of the Legislature was
solely to insure accuracy in machine voting, an interpretation finding that the
statute required only a counting of the ballots would frustrate that intent
and render the statute meaningless.
shall be chosen at random and the ballot cards cast therein counted manually. The same
random selection shall also be counted by the automatic tabulating equipment. If the
variance between the random manual count and the automatic tabulating equipment
count of the same random ballots is equal to or greater than one percent, then a manual
recount of all ballot cards shall be required. In the course of any recount, if a candidate
for an office shall so demand, or if the board of canvassers shall so elect to recount the
votes cast for an office, the votes cast for that office in any precinct shall be recounted
by manual count.
' 301 S.E.2d at 184.
Id. at 184 (citing State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968)).
Id. at 185.
2

Id.

31 Id.
3 Id.

I Id. at 187.
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II.

TITLES OF LEGISLATIVE BILLS

C. C. "Spike" Copley Garage, Inc. v. PSC, 300 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va. 1983).
During its 1974 session the West Virginia Legislature radically changed
the operation of the state's Public Service Commission by enacting an omnibus statute' which effectively deregulated the business of towing, hauling
or carrying wrecked or disabled vehicles in West Virginia. 5 In C.C. "Spike"
Copley Garage, Inc. v. PSC declaratory action was brought in the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County seeking to have the deregulation provision declared unconstitutional because no mention of that provision was made in the
title of the bill. The circuit court granted the relief sought, finding the title of
the bill to be constitutionally defective. 7
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, through Justice Neely, affirmed the holding of the lower court. The court took cognizance of the constitutional intent to inform the legislature and the general public of the contents of a legislative proposal.' It stated a general rule as such: "If the title
of an act states its general theme or purpose and the substance is germane to
the object expressed in the title, the title will be held sufficient." 9 Nevertheless, the court rejected the appellant's argument that the title of the bill
gave notice that its subject matter was "'all relating to the organization, composition, authority and operations of the Public Service Commission ....""I
The court drew a distinction between the title of a bill which appraised all
concerned of its "general theme or purpose" and a title which purported to
exhaustively list all elements of the bill.41 The bill in question had a lengthy
" W. VA. CODE § 24A-2-2a (1980).

SId.
300 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va. 1983).
W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 30 provides in pertinent part:

No act hereafter passed, shall embrace more than one object, and that shall be expressed in the title. But if any object shall be embraced in an act which is not so expressed, the act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed,
and no law shall be revived, or amended, by reference to its title only; but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at large, in the new act.
1 "The purpose of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution of West Virginia is to prevent
the concealment of the true purpose of an act from the public and the Legislature and to advise
the legislators and the public of the contents of the proposed act of the legislature." 300 S.E.2d at
488 (quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Oakley, 156 W. Va. 154, 157, 191 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1972)).
300 S.E.2d at 486.
'0

Id. (footnote omitted).

The title to [this bill] is not infirm because it is vague and unspecific, but rather
because it is positively misleading. A person reading a title to a bill drawn with the
specificity of the title to [this bill] who finds no mention of wrecker services in the title
would reasonably conclude that the act did not touch that subject because all the other
concerns are set forth with specificity.
Id. at 487.
"
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title 2 which failed to mention the trucking deregulation. Hence, the court
found the title "positively misleading" and effectively deleted the deregulation provision from the bill. 3
From the court's analysis it is apparent that a title to a bill must be
either of a competent general nature or an exacting recountal of the bill's
contents. A title which attempts to give a rundown on the components of a
bill and falls short of that will not pass constitutional review.
III.

DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE

State ex rel. Quelch v. Daugherty, 306 S.E.2d 233 (W. Va. 1983).
Prompted by the West Virginia Legislature's decision to abrogate the
diploma privilege for graduates of the West Virginia University College of
Law, 4 four students of that institution sought a writ of mandamus from the
state supreme court to prohibit the Board of Law Examiners from requiring
them to successfully pass the bar examination upon graduation." In granting
the writ, the court declared the statute manifesting the Legislature's intent
to be void as a breach of the constitutional provision for separation of
powers. 8
The majority's position, as explained by Justice Harshbarger, was based
purely upon constitutional grounds. First, the majority announced that it felt
constrained by the separation of powers provision set forth in the state con1
stitution."
Second, it noted that the 1974 Judicial Reorganization Amendment to the state constitution had vested judicial power solely in the court. 8
The majority cited earlier authority to the effect that this grant of power included the power to admit and disbar attorneys.'9 After the Legislature had
acted, there was a clear conflict in the law between the amended statute
abolishing the diploma privilege and the court rule50 retaining it. The
42 The

length of the title is such that it is not feasible to set it forth here. However, some in-

dication of its tedious nature can be gathered from the fact that approximately 726 words are contained therein. See 1979 W. Va. Acts 98; see also 300 S.E.2d at 486 n.1.
300 S.E.2d at 487.
43

"
41

W. VA. CODE § 30-2-1 (Supp. 1983).
State ex rel. Quelch v. Daugherty, 306 S.E.2d 233 (W. Va. 1983).

"3W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1 provides:
The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so
that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others; nor

shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of .hem at the same time, except
that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the legislature.
41 See Id.
" W. VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1 provides, in pertinent part: "The judicial power of the State
shall be vested solely in a supreme court of appeals ...
'3 Carey v. Dostert, 294 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982).
'o W. VA. CODE, Code of Rules for Admission to the Practice of Law Rule 1.020, reprintedin
vol. 1A of the W. VA. CODE (1982).
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majority concluded that an act of the Legislature intruding upon the constitutionally exclusive domain of the court to admit attorneys was repugnant to
the principles in the separation of powers clause.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Neely took a different approach. He
questioned the effect of the statute at issue to require graduates of the West
Virginia University College of Law to take the bar examination. 1 Rather,
Neely took the position that the Legislature, by removing the diploma
privilege from the Code, was merely leaving the question to the discretion of
the court.2 Justice Neely did not dispute the power of the legislature to require the bar examination;"3 he just didn't think it had done so with the questioned statute. Reaching the merits of the diploma privilege itself, he was
pleased to leave it in place. 4
Justice Miller, dissenting, agreed with Justice Neely's assertion that the
Legislature had the power to require the bar exam. 5 Furthermore, he found
that requiring the exam was the intention of the Legislature. 6 He argued
that the majority had "ignored the familar postulate that a legislative act
relating to the practice of law is not necessarily invalid." 57 Along this line, he
brought up the point that the Legislature itself had first enacted the diploma
privilege" and that the court had not formulated a parallel rule until 1973.1'
Justice Miller does not divulge, however, his perception of the 1974 Judicial
Reorganization Amendment's impact on the separation of powers provision
found in the constitution. Instead, the justice focused his attention on the
merits of the diploma privilege, an analysis that goes more to the question of
keeping or discarding the privilege rather than to whether the Legislature
had the power to abolish it.
Bryan R. Cokeley

5 306 S.E.2d at 236 (Neely, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 237. While a literal reading of the statute itself might support this conclusion, an
analysis of the obvious legislative intent would probably lead to an opposite position.
6 Id.
r Id.
I Id. at 237 (Miller, J., dissenting).
soId.

7 Id.
I Id. at 238 (citing 1847 W. Va. Acts 50).
5

Id.
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